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This article argues that a mandatory rule of at will revocability of company directors is typical
of European civil law. The article shows that the rule is widely spread on the European
continent, but not as a result of harmonization efforts of the European Union. Instead, the
rule has its historical foundations in the early development of French law. It first appeared as a
general rule in Napoleon’s codification of commercial law and subsequently extended to the
other major jurisdictions in the French and German civil law family. Despite some tempering
of the rule, especially in theGerman legal tradition, it still plays an important role in European
civil law jurisdictions. In traditional common law, in contrast, the rule is extraneous. It did not
appear in old common law, was merely a default rule when first introduced in the United
Kingdom, and is still notmandatory in theUnited States. These novel findings shed important
light on some other differences in company law, and possibly also in prevailing stock ownership
structures, between civil law and common law jurisdictions, and thus lay a promising basis for
further research.
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Introduction
The most important voting right of shareholders is probably the right to elect
and dismiss directors. The election of directors has been called “the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”1 It usu-
ally garners a lot of attention among scholars and policymakers. The same has
not been true for the right to dismiss directors, although it is at least of equal
concern. This article therefore explores the neglected topic of the latitude of
shareholders meetings to remove directors of public companies over time and
across several jurisdictions in Europe and the United States. The specific
question is whether the law mandatorily prescribes that shareholders have
the right to remove directors at will, and whether a general principle can be
distilled at a regional or international level. The analysis is restricted to the law
applicable to companies with publicly traded stock.
Part IIof this article startsoffwithan inquiry into thecurrent scopeof the ruleof
at will dismissal of company directors on the European continent. The rule is
usually applied more vigorously in single-tier boards than in dual-tier boards.
There is a markedly strict mandatory rule of at will removal in a few French-
originjurisdictionswithaone-tierboard,suchasFranceandBelgium.Asiswell-
known,Germany,Austria and in some cases theNetherlands impose a two-tier
board structure. Although the rule of at will removal has been significantly
impaired for thesedual tierboards, this article shows that it still plays avital role.
Readers might conjecture that this commonality across the jurisdictions exam-
inedmight result fromEuropeanUnion regulation. Part III therefore examines
whether the EuropeanUnion has taken any initiatives in this field andwhether
at will removal of directors is equally important in European countries that are
not member of the European Union. Because no influence from the European
Union can be detected, Part IV unravels the origins of at will revocability of
directors in the civil law tradition. It finds that at will revocability was first
explicitly stated as a general and mandatory rule in Napoleon’sCode de Com-
merce of 1807. Together with the Napoleonic codes, it spread out over conti-
nental Europe. Without taking a position in debates over the future of private
law in Europe, I thus argue that at will revocability can be rated among the
common principles, or ius commune in a modern sense, of European civil law.
1 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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In contrast, the analysis reveals that traditional common lawdid not feature the
principle of at will revocability. Surprisingly, this discrepancy between com-
mon law and European civil law has so far been largely overlooked in legal and
economic scholarship. Part V therefore takes a look at the current situation and
history in the United Kingdom and the United States. Whereas the former has
over time adopted a compulsory rule of at will revocability, the latter have not.
Despite recent efforts to enhance the position of stockholders in American
companies, they still usually only have limited power to remove directors.
These findings do not support the conclusion that directors of continental
European companies live in great uncertainty. They often put other means to
use, such as procedural rules relating to shareholders meetings or techniques
derived from labor law, in order to complicate their revocation by the share-
holders meeting or to obtain indemnification should they effectively be dis-
missed.Another source of safety lies in the appointment by a controlling share-
holder. Because of the presence of a controlling shareholder, nonewcontrolling
shareholder or temporary coalition can then arise and remove the director.
Consequently, he does not have to fear removal as long as he is the controlling
shareholder, or faithfully complieswith the controller’swishes. The conclusion
suggests how, along these lines, the divergence between common lawandEuro-
pean civil law with regard to director removal may contribute to our under-
standing of, among others, why stock ownership is predominantly dispersed in
the former and concentrated in the latter. Introducing the findings of this article
in comparative research is therefore bound to yield interesting new insights,
especially with regard to differences between civil and common law.
I. Definition and Importance of At Will Revocability
1. Definition
This article investigates how prevalent a mandatory rule of at will revocability
is internationally and historically. This encompasses first the question of
whether the shareholders meeting or, in some cases, a body appointed by it,
has the power to remove directors at will. At will revocability is often termed
”ad nutum” revocability. ”Ad nutum” is Latin for “at will” or, literally, “at a
nod”.2 In a figurative sense, a nod is all it takes to remove a director under a
rule of at will revocability. The second part of the question is whether the law
sets out the rule of at will removal in a mandatory way. In that event, share-
holders derive their right to dismiss directors at will directly from the statute,
2 Nutus (m.): nod; command, will.
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and companies are not allowed to encroach upon any aspects of this right – in
their articles of association or elsewhere.
When at will revocability is applicable to its fullest extent, four key compo-
nents can be distinguished. First, “at will”means that the shareholdersmeeting
can oust incumbent directors at any time. In other words, they are not obliged
to wait until the annual general meeting and can proceed to the removal in an
extraordinary general meeting.3 Second, if shareholders can truly remove di-
rectors at will, they do not need to show a good cause for removal. In fact, they
do not need to mention any cause at all, and often it is considered prudent not
to do so. This condition bears on the third component of at will removal,
namely that removal cannot in itself trigger any duty to pay an indemnification
or termination fee. But at will revocability is not an authorization to be rude.
Libel or insults made in the course of the removal procedure normally imply a
fault under civil law rules, for which damages are due. That is not inconsistent
with the rule of ad nutum revocability.
The three elements listed above are part of the traditional definition of at will
removability.4 As the following analysis will show, a fourth condition must be
added to this list, namely that the shareholders meeting is allowed to remove
any number of directors at the same time.5 If removal is possible only for a
certain number of directors or for the entire board, the shareholders meeting
can no longer be said to freely exercise its will.
2. Importance
The legal and economic importance of the power to remove directors at will is
considerable. On a legal level, it includes not only the consequences that the
law explicitly attaches to it, such as nullity of charter or contract provisions
entered into by the company that impinge on removability, limitations on
directors’ ability to enter into an employment agreement with the company
etc.6 The importance of other legal provisions is also affected, especially those
3 The focus here is on the substantive requirements. Procedural aspects, such as the power
to convene an extraordinary meeting or to add an item to the agenda or the company’s
proxy, fall outside the scope of this article.
4 Only few authors have attempted to define the concept of at will revocability. E.g. Alain
François et al., Omgaan met conflicten in vennootschappen: regeling van geschillen is
meer dan geschillenregeling, in Omgaan met conflicten in de vennootschap 39
(Koen Byttebier et al. eds., 2009); Maurice Cozian et al., Droit des sociétés 357
(21st ed. 2008).
5 See infra, Part II.2(i).
6 EddyWymeersch,A Status Report onCorporateGovernance Rules and Practices in Some
Continental European States, in Comparative Corporate Governance. The State
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related to the distribution of power within corporations. Directors can appear
enormously powerful when they have the right to amend the corporate charter
and to decide on reincorporation, mergers, acquisitions, and the sale of sub-
stantially all assets and distributions. Yet, power can shift perceptibly depend-
ing on the rules governing appointment and dismissal of directors. If a board
with broad substantive powers is in fact re-electing itself and does not need to
fear removal, it can run the company as a despot. If, in contrast, the share-
holders meeting freely appoints and dismisses directors, the situation is differ-
ent. The power to sack directors at any time with no need for justification
serves as an ultimate stick for shareholders who disagree with the board’s
decisions – even if those decisions, strictly speaking, are within the latter’s
exclusive competence.
In a similar vein, at will revocability affects two agency problems. First, it
mitigates the so-called “first agency problem”7 caused by the separation of
decision and risk-bearing functions between board (and management), on the
one hand, and small shareholders, on the other hand.8 Whenever the interests
of the directors are not perfectly aligned with those of the shareholders, the
directors may be tempted to serve their private interests and thus display
suboptimal corporate performance. Shareholders’ power to remove directors
is a major tool for tackling the first agency problem.9 Lifting all or most
of the Art and Emerging Research 1044, 1092–93 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998).
See, for Belgium: Didier Willermain, Le statut de l’administrateur de sociétés anony-
mes: principes, questions et réflexions, 107 Revue Pratique des Sociétés (207) 251–52
(2008).
7 In some respects, however, at will removal can alsomagnify the first agency problem. The
insecurity of his position can allegedly lead a director to overinvest in short-term proj-
ects, or to display excessive risk-aversion (see Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and
Managerial Myopia, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61 (1988)). Easy removal of directors may also
jeopardize the continuity of a firm’s management (see Richard H. Koppes et al., Corpo-
rate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 Bus. Law. 1023,
1051–52 (1999)). If limited removability allows directors to extract better terms in case of
a takeover (Robert Comment &G.William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Moderns Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. Fin. Econ. 3
(1995)), then these benefits are lost in a system of at will removal. However, several
prominent scholars argue that the incumbents generally do not use their leverage for
the shareholders’ benefit: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Cor-
porate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973, 1007–10 (2002); John C. Coates IV, Takeover
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 Tex. L. Rev.
271, 337 (2000); John C. Coates IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses:
Where Do We Stand?, 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783, 794–96 (2000).
8 Adolf A. Berle Jr. & Gardiner C.Means, TheModern Corporation and Private
Property 2–3 (1933); John Armour et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in The
Anatomy of Corporate Law 39, 42 (Reinier Kraakman et al., 2nd ed. 2009).
9 Armour et al., supra note 8, at 39–44.
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conditions for using the right of removal obviously reinforces the efficacy of
such a right. Its effects are in the first place preventive, in that directors are
more likely to act in accordance with the shareholders’ wishes in the face of a
credible threat of removal, be it independently or in the context of a takeover.
At will revocability indeed enhances the strength of the takeover threat by
barring certain entrenchment devices and thus aggravating the expected con-
sequences for the incumbents and its appeal to candidate acquirers. If pre-
vention fails, effective removal can serve as a remedy.10 Empirical evidence
abounds that some entrenchment techniques that would not be allowed under
a mandatory rule of at will revocability reduce the chances of success of take-
over bids11 (which are often associated with increased shareholder wealth),12
render the successful bids less efficient,13 and, outside the takeover context, are
associated with lower firm valuation and performance.14
Second, at will revocability intensifies the “second agency problem,” which
stems from the divergence of interests between controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders when stock ownership is not fully dispersed. As men-
tioned before, at will revocability enables the shareholders meeting to influ-
ence themanagement of the corporation. In the presence of a large shareholder
10 SeeHenry G. Manne,Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ.
110, 112-14 (1965).
11 E.g. Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002). The combination of an
effective staggered board (which flies in the face of at will revocability) with a poison
pill makes it almost chanceless an undertaking to replace the board through a hostile bid.
A staggered board is characterized as an “effective staggered board” if a staggered board
“is installed in the charter, directors may only be removed for cause, and shareholders
may not ‘pack the board’ by increasing the number of directors and filling the vacancies
created” (id. at 894, emphasis added).
12 E.g. Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy
Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Perform-
ance, 21(3) Fin. Mgmt. 22 (1992); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy
Contests and Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. Fin. Econ.
279 (1998).
13 When incumbents are difficult to remove, their bargaining power in negotiations with
insurgents increases, which they can use to extract personal benefits. See e.g. Lucian
A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev.
973, 991 (2002); Jay Hartzell et al.,What’s in it for Me? Personal Benefits Obtained by
CEOs Whose Firms are Acquired, 17 Rev. Fin. St. 37 (2004). See supra, note 6.
14 E.g. Bebchuk et al., supra note 11 (staggered boards are associated with lower firm
value); Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. Fin.
Econ. 409 (2005) (idem); Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Gover-
nance?, 22 Rev. Fin. St. 783 (2009) (entrenchment, among others by means that are
irreconcilable with at will removability, correlates with lower corporate performance
and firm valuation).
ECFR 2/2011Sofie Cools204
or group of shareholders who dominate the shareholders meeting, this ability
to interfere in management is effectively exercised by the largest sharehold-
er(s) rather than by the shareholders meeting as a whole. This situation opens
up possibilities for expropriation and tunneling, etc.15 Empirical evidence
shows that these pernicious effects are especially strong where shareholder
protection is weak.16
At will removability of directors, one can conclude, limits directors’ relative
independence within the corporation, thereby mitigating their failure to align
with shareholder interests while exacerbating the potential for conflicts of
interest among controlling and minority shareholders. Stated differently, it
plays a positive role in jurisdictions where corporations are primarily plagued
by the first agency problem – typically those with diffuse stock ownership –
and possibly a negative role where the second agency problem dominates –
necessarily characterized by concentrated stock ownership. More than that,
one could theorize that there is some causality to this relationship.17 Argu-
ably, a mandatory rule of at will removability virtually precludes the coming
into existence of the first agency problem, because it does not allow the board
to act independently from the shareholders meeting. The absence of a man-
datory rule of at will removability, conversely, does allow this to happen.
Similarly, at will removability of directors could stimulate the concentration
of stock ownership with its concomitant second agency problem. Indeed,
under a mandatory rule of at will removability, the ownership of a large
amount of stock is necessary to maintain control over the firm’s management.
However, such a rule could not only be one of the causes, but also a con-
sequence of the existence of controlling stockholders. By lobbying for such a
rule, the established company owners could safeguard their control over the
board. Although the direction of the hypothesized causal relationship re-
mains unclear, the existence thereof seems plausible and should become
clearer through a comparative and historical analysis of director removability
without cause.
15 E.g.Mike Burkart et al., Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, 112
Q. J. Fin. Econ. 693 (1997).
16 E.g. Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. Fin. 1147
(2002). See however, with regard to the methodology: Sofie Cools, The Real Difference
in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of
Powers, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 697, 704–36 (2005).
17 Cools, supra note 16, at 745–50, 755–62; Sofie Cools, La répartition juridique des
pouvoirs au sein des sociétés d’Europe continentale et des sociétés américaines, 106Revue
Pratique des Sociétés 149, 179–92 (2007).
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II. Occurrence in Continental Europe
This Part reveals how widespread the principle of at will removal of directors
is on the European continent. The first section documents that it is most
vigorously applied in one-tier boards, which occur mostly in jurisdictions of
the French civil law tradition. In the second section, the principle is also shown
to play an important role in two-tier boards, including those of the German
tradition. The historical analysis in Part IV will moreover establish that this
was even more so in one-tier boards in the German law tradition before it
introduced the dual board structure.
1. At Will Revocability in Single-Tier Boards
Some of the strongest examples of at will revocability are found in French and
Belgian corporate law. Both jurisdictions – which are highly similar in the field
of corporate law – traditionally provided only for one-tier boards (conseil
d’administration/raad van bestuur) and introduced the option of a two-tier
board later.18 A single-tier board in a French or Belgian stock corporation
(société anonyme/naamloze vennootschap) is appointed by the shareholders
meeting.19 The corporate codes of both countries explicitly state that the meet-
ing can also remove directors at any time.20 There is nomaximum orminimum
number of directors that can be removed simultaneously, no need to give a
reason, to indemnify the dismissed director or to abide by a notice period.21
This is at will revocability to its full extent. It has been repeatedly labeled not
just as a mandatory rule, but – even stronger – as a rule of public order. This
implies that any clause in the charter or an agreement to which the corporation
is a party, that states the contrary, or that would directly or indirectly impair
the shareholders meeting to make use of its removal right, is null and void.22
18 See infra, Part II.2.
19 Art. L. 225-18, al. 1 French Commercial Code; art. 518 para. 2 Belgian Companies
Code.
20 Art. L. 225-18, al. 2 French Commercial Code; art. 518 para. 3 Belgian Companies
Code.
21 For France:Michel Germain, Les sociétés commerciales 459 (19th ed. 2009); Phil-
ippe Merle, Droit Commercial. Sociétés Commerciales 440 (14th ed. 2010). For
Belgium: Jacques Malherbe et al., Droit des sociétés. Précis 540 (2004); Pierre
Van Ommeslaghe, La cessation des fonctions des administrateurs, des gérants et des
membres du comité de direction, in Les conflits au sein des sociétés commerciales
ou à forme commerciale 109–10 (Editions du Jeune Barreau de Bruxelles ed., 2004).
In France, the item of removal does not even have to appear on themeeting’s agenda (art.
L. 225-105 al. 3 French Commercial Code).
22 In addition, a void provision cannot be confirmed by the corporation when a dispute
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The consequences are extensive: the company’s charter cannot increase the
quorum or majority requirements for the shareholders meeting to remove
directors,23 and even commitments by the company to pay golden parachutes
to its directors are problematic.24
True, corporate law may not have the same goals as other fields of law. The
field of labor law, in particular, has been gratefully used by directors to circum-
vent or alleviate some of the consequences of at will revocability. When a
director can enter into a labor agreement with the company, he may derive
substantial protection from that relationship. French and Belgian law have
limited this possibility, among others by barring an employment agreement
for any function that is not clearly different from the function of director.25 A
second technique consists of entering into an agreement with one or more
individual shareholders, in which the latter promises not to vote to dismiss the
directors, or to personally commit to indemnification in case of removal.26
A somewhat similar picture exists in the Netherlands. A Dutch stock corpo-
ration (naamloze vennootschap) that is not subject to the “structure regime”27
can have only a (managing) board of directors (raad van bestuur) and no
supervisory board. These executive directors can be dismissed by those who
appointed them,28 namely the shareholders meeting.29 The Dutch Civil Code
explicitly states, in amandatoryway,30 that dismissal can bemade at any time.31
arises if the infringed rule is of public order. This qualification is criticized by many
scholars, who argue that the rule should be mandatory at most. Yves Guyon, Traité
des contrats. Les Sociétés. Aménagements statutaires et conventions entre
associés 397–98 (5th ed. 2002) (France);FrankHellemans,DeAlgemeneVergader-
ing. Een onderzoek naar haar grondslagen, haar bestaansreden en de geldig-
heid van haar besluiten 651 (2000) (Belgium); Koen Geens &Hilde Laga,Overzicht
van rechtspraak vennootschappen 1986–1991, TPR 1027–28 (1994) (Belgium).
23 Bernard Tilleman, Bestuur van vennootschappen 298–99 (2005) (Belgium);
Pierre-Gilles Gourlay, Le Conseil d’Administration de la Société Anonyme.
Organisation et fonctionnement 41 (1971) (France).
24 Merle, supra note 21, at 440–41 (France); Tilleman, supra note 23, at 300 (Belgium).
25 Tilleman, supra note 23, at 306 (Belgium). In addition, French law forbids a director
already in function to become an employee and does not allow that more than one third
of the directors are bound by an employment contract with the company (Cozian et
al., supra note 4, at 248–50;Merle, supra note 21, at 448–51).
26 Malherbe et al., supra note 21, at 543 (Belgium).
27 See infra, Part II.2.
28 Art. 2:134 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
29 Art. 2:132 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
30 Art. 2:25DutchCivil Code;C.Asser et al., Rechtspersonenrecht II. De naamloze
en besloten vennootschap 533 (2009).
31 Art. 2:134 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code. This article also limits the possibility of increasing
the majority and quorum requirements for dismissal of directors.
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There is no need to observe a notice period, to show a good cause or to dismiss
a certainmaximumorminimum number of directors at once.32 In other words,
the rule of at will revocability is in full play in the corporate law provisions
governing these “one-tier” corporations. However, Dutch law qualifies the
relationship between a director and the company in which he serves as a
hybrid, or combination, of a functional (“organ”) and a contractual – mostly
employment – relationship. Because they are indivisible, the termination of
the former implies the termination of the latter.33 The director is therefore
entitled to an indemnification if the notice period is not respected.34
Another qualification relates to the scope of at will revocability in corporate
law.Not all jurisdictions on the European continent take at will revocability as
far as described above. Italian corporate law, for example, recognizes the
principle of at will revocability of board members, but with some exceptions.
An Italian stock corporation (società per azioni) can be organized according to
three models,35 one of which is a one-tier board structure.36 Under this struc-
ture, the company is governed by a board of directors with a supervisory
committee installed within the board. As a rule, directors are appointed by a
shareholders meeting37 and the directors then elect the members of the com-
mittee from among themselves.38 All or some of the directors can be revoked
by the shareholders meeting at any time.39 The removal may take place even if
there is no just ground, but in that instance an indemnification may be due.40
Italy thus comes just one component short of full at will revocability for its
one-tier boards.
A detailed and up-to-date analysis of all European jurisdictions falls outside
the scope of this article. However, it should be noted that many of them,
including Scandinavian states such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden, have
been reported in extant legal doctrine to include some basic principle of at
will revocability of directors.41 Similarly, corporate law in Luxembourg and
Spain explicitly provide that members of a one-tier board in a stock corpo-
32 The law stipulates that “any director” can be removed “at any time” (id.).With regard to
the absence of a notice period: J.B. Huizink, Rechtspersoon, vennootschap en
onderneming 114 (2009).
33 Hoge Raad 15 april 2005, LJNAS2713,R.v.d.W. 2005, No. 55; Hoge Raad 15 april 2005,
LJN AS2030, R.v.d.W. 2005, No. 57; Asser et al., supra note 30, at 518-21.
34 Asser et al., supra note 30, at 520.
35 Art. 2380 Italian Civil Code.
36 Art. 2409-sexiesdecies Italian Civil Code. For the two-tier structures, see infra Part II.2.
37 Art. 2383 al. 1, as referred to by art. 2409-noviesdecies Italian Civil Code.
38 Art. 2409-octiesdecies, al. 1 Italian Civil Code.
39 Artt. 2383 al. 3, 2409-noviesdecies Italian Civil Code.
40 Id.
41 Wymeersch, supra note 6, at 1092 n.161.
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ration are not only appointed by the shareholders meeting,42 but also that they
can be removed at any time.43
2. AWatered-Down Version in Most Two-Tier Boards
In two-tier boards, the appointment and removal of directors – especially of
managing directors – is often no longer within the competence of the share-
holders meeting. In addition, its say normally does not extend to supervisory
board members appointed by another corporate constituency, such as the
employee base, if any. This section demonstrates that, while these general-
izations are true theoretically speaking, in practice the shareholders meeting
often has considerable influence in the removal of members of both tiers of the
board. The following paragraphs first deal with the most strict of two-tier
board models, namely the German and the Dutch models, and then moves on
to discuss removal in the optional and less stringent two-tier structures in
several other European jurisdictions.
(i) Germany, Austria and the Netherlands
A text book case of a two-tier board is that found in the German and the – less
well-known but strikingly similar – Austrian stock corporation (Aktiengesell-
schaft), which include a management board (Vorstand) and supervisory board
(Aufsichtsrat). While this system increases director independence by reducing
shareholder influence in the choice of members of the management board, the
effect is often overstated. True, members of the management board are man-
datorily and exclusively to be appointed by the supervisory board,44 and can be
dismissed only by the latter and only then for a good cause.45 Under certain
42 Art. 51 al. 3 Luxembourg Corporations Act. For Spain: Almudena Arpón de Mendívil,
Spain, inGuide to European Company Laws 862 (JulianMaitland-Walker ed., 3rd ed.
2008).
43 Artt. 50 & 51 al. 4 Luxembourg Corporations Act. This provision is of public order:
Pierre-Henri Conac, Les organes de la société anonyme (SA) en droit luxembourgeois, in
Le nouveau droit luxembourgeois des sociétiés 53, 60 (André Prüm ed., 2008). For
Spain: Arpón de Mendívil, supra note 42, at 863; Wymeersch, supra note 6, at 1092.
44 § 84(1), first sentence German Stock Corporation Act; § 75(1) Austrian Stock Corpo-
ration Act.
45 § 84(3) German Stock Corporation Act; § 75(4) Austrian Stock Corporation Act. In
Germany, a decision to dismiss a member of the management board can be taken by
simple majority. However, if the company is subject to the codetermination regulations,
a three-tiered procedure applies, starting off with a majority of at least two thirds in the
first round and lowering the requirements in the next rounds (GerhardWirth et al.,
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conditions, the company may also agree to pay a termination fee.46 Moreover,
when codetermination applies, a number of directors on the supervisory board
are appointed and dismissed by the employees.47 However, several accompa-
nying rules significantly mitigate the directors’ independence.
To begin with, the shareholders meeting has a large degree of control over its
representatives in the supervisory board, which always have the upper hand
over employee representatives.48 Indeed, shareholder representatives in the
supervisory board are elected by the general meeting with a simple majority,49
and can be removed ad nutum by the shareholders meeting,50 with no require-
ment of good cause51 or right to indemnification.52 Admittedly, the default
Corporate Law in Germany 107 (2nd ed. 2010)). In Austria, the removal of manage-
ment board members requires a “double majority”, which means that both the board as
a whole as well as shareholder representatives must vote in favor (§ 110(3) Labor Con-
stitutionAct; SusanneKalss,Aktiengesellschaft, inOsterreichischesGesellschafts-
recht para. 3/258) (Susanne Kalss et al., 2008).
46 Christoph H. Seibt, § 84 Bestellung und Abberufung des Vorstands, in 1 Aktiengesetz
Kommentar 948 (Karsten Schmidt & Marcus Lutter eds., 2008) (Germany); Kalss,
supra note 45, para 3/289 (Austria).
47 See the German Codetermination Act and the Austrian Labor Constitution Act. For an
overview of the degree of worker involvement in case of German codetermination, see
ChristineWindbichler,Gesellschaftsrecht 369–70 (22nd ed. 2009);Wirth et al.,
supra note 45, at 117-18.
48 InGermany, employee representatives can take up to half of the supervisory board seats,
but in that case the president, who is a shareholder representative, has a casting vote:
Windbichler, supra note 47, at 374–75;Wirth et al., supra note 45, at 123. In Austria,
only one third of the supervisory boardmembers are employee representatives (§ 110(1)
LaborConstitutionAct). In addition, shareholders are protected by the doublemajority
requirement (see supra, note 45).
49 § 101(1) German Stock Corporation Act; § 87(1) Austrian Stock Corporation Act. In
Germany, the supervisory board has to make a non-binding proposal (§§ 124(3), 101(1)
German Stock Corporation Act). Both in German and Austrian publicly traded firms,
the charter may empower the owners of specific restricted shares to appoint up to one
third of shareholder representatives (§ 101(2) German Stock Corporation Act; § 88(1)
Austrian Stock Corporation Act). In Austria, if at least three supervisory board mem-
bers are elected in the same meeting, a minority of one third can insist on appointing a
minority representative. (§ 87(4) Austrian Stock Corporation Act). In practice, the
appointment procedure can be easily circumvented (Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/483).
50 § 103(1) German Stock Corporation Act; § 87(8) Austrian Stock Corporation Act. In
Germany, supervisory boardmembers can also be revoked by court upon request by the
supervisory board or, under certain conditions, a minority of shareholders, if a good
cause can be shown (§ 103(3) German Stock Corporation Act). In Austria, the super-
visory board cannot request a removal, but a 10%minority can (§ 87(10) Austrian Stock
Corporation Act).
51 Tim Drygala, § 103 Abberufung der Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, in 1 Aktiengesetz Kom-
mentar, supra note 46, at 1139 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/487 (Austria).
52 Drygala, supra note 51, at 1141 (Germany).
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majority requirement for removal is one of three fourths,53 but the articles can,
and mostly do, set it at a simple majority.54 They cannot, however, impose
substantive requirements for removal.55
In turn, the shareholders meeting, together with the supervisory board, has a
larger degree of freedom in removing management board members than the
good cause requirement would lead one to suspect. The reason is that if the
shareholders meeting passes a vote of no confidence, this vote can be consid-
ered an important reason for removal.56 In that event, the supervisory board
can, but is not obliged, to dismiss the managing director concerned.57 In prac-
tice, the supervisory board is in large part controlled by the shareholders
meeting and will therefore likely meet the latter’s wish.58 As a result, even
though in theory the shareholders meeting does not dispose of the right of
at will revocability as far as members of the management board are concerned,
the practical outcome will often be functionally equivalent to a large extent.
This effect is further strengthened in practice by the rule that director revo-
cation is fully effective until proven that there was no adequate reason.59
One last qualification is in order. Again, corporate law does not provide the
full picture. The internal relationship between directors and the stock corpo-
ration is not only an institutional (organ) relationship, but also a contractual
one.60 Unless contractually agreed,61 the director’s service agreement62 does
53 § 103(1) German Stock Corporation Act; § 87(8) Austrian Stock Corporation Act.
54 Id.; Wirth et al., supra note 45, at 121 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/487
n.123 (Austria).
55 Drygala, supra note 51, at 1140.
56 § 84(3) German Stock Corporation Act; § 75(4) Austrian Stock Corporation Act.
Although such resolution does not need a special justification, it may not be based on
manifestly arbitrary grounds (id.; Seibt, supra note 46, at 968).
57 Wirth et al., supra note 45, at 106 (Germany); Windbichler, supra note 47, at 338
(Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/306 (Austria).
58 SeeWindbichler, supra note 47, at 381 (Germany); Peter Doralt,Die Unabhängigkeit
des Vorstands nach österreichischem und deutschem Aktienrecht – Schein und Wirk-
lichkeit, in Die Gestaltung der Organisationsdynamik (31) 47–48 (Werner
H. Hoffmann ed., 2003) (Germany and Austria).
59 § 84(3) German Stock Corporation Act; § 75(4) Austrian Stock Corporation Act. See
Friedrich Kübler & Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Gesellschaftsrecht 203 (6th ed.
2006).
60 For members of the management board: Kübler & Assmann, supra note 59, at 201
(Germany); Seibt, supra note 46, at 948 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/278
(Austria). This is sometimes debated for members of the supervisory board: Tim Dry-
gala, § 101 Bestellung der Aufsichtsratsmitglieder, in 1 Aktiengesetz Kommentar,
supra note 46, at 1123 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/493 (Austria).
61 Seibt, supra note 46, at 973.
62 The agreement is qualified as a service contract, but not an employment agreement
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not automatically end upon his removal as director. Exceptionally, a sufficient
ground may be present to terminate the contractual relationship without a
notice period.63 If not – and this is not uncommon – the director will cease to
hold office, but will continue to be paid until end of his or her term of office.64
Againwe see that contract law can be used tomitigate the effects of revocation.
The second classic example of a board that is strongly separated into two tiers
is the Dutch “large companies regime” or “structure regime” (structuurre-
gime), which was introduced in 1971. This regime applies to companies that
subject themselves voluntarily, as well as to large stock corporations (naam-
loze vennootschappen), i.e. companies that meet a number of criteria with
regard to capital and number of employees and that have a works council.65
In the structure regime, a supervisory board (raad van commissarissen) is
compulsory.66 The original version of the regime entailed an extreme deviation
of the principle of ad nutum revocability. Members of the supervisory board
were appointed through a system of “controlled co-optation” by the super-
visory board itself, whereby shareholders’ influence was reduced to a recom-
mendation right and a limited right of objection. Put differently, they had
”[relinquished] the essence of their power, namely the appointment and dis-
missal of supervisory board members”.67
It should not come as a surprise that the exemptions offered by theDutchCivil
Code were eagerly used,68 and that the structure regime was considerably
toned down in 2004. The shareholders meeting and the works council can still
recommend supervisory board members to the supervisory board.69 The main
difference is that, unless the charter stipulates differently,70 the latter then
proposes candidates to the shareholders meeting, which decides on the actual
(Seibt, supra note 46, at 955 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/280, 3/300 (Aus-
tria).)
63 Kübler & Assmann, supra note 59, at 203 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/279
(Austria).
64 Wirth et al., supra note 45, at 109 (Germany); Kalss, supra note 45, para. 3/279
(Austria). It should be noted that the maximum period of the service contract is five
years (§ 84(1)German StockCorporationAct; § 75(1) Austrian StockCorporationAct).
65 Art. 2:153–154 Dutch Civil Code.
66 Art. 2:158 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
67 P. Van Schilfgaarde & J. Winter, Van de BV en de NV 415 (15th ed. 2009) (own
translation).
68 Art. 153 para. 3, 155, 155(a) Dutch Civil Code; Van Schilfgaarde & Winter, supra
note 67, at 415, 434–39.
69 Art. 2:158 para. 5 Dutch Civil Code. For one third of the members of the supervisory
board, the candidates recommended by the works council must be proposed by the
supervisory counsel unless it can invoke certain grounds listed in the statute (art. 2:158
para. 6 Dutch Civil Code).
70 Art. 2:158 para. 12 Dutch Civil Code.
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appointment.71 The 2004 amendments have thus improved shareholder say in
the appointment of the supervisory board members. The same is true for their
removal. When the shareholders meeting withdraws its confidence in the
supervisory board – at will – the legal and mandatory consequence thereof
is now the dismissal of the entire supervisory board.72 This is not so for
individual supervisory board members. They cannot separately be removed
against their will except by the enterprise chamber on the basis of specific (but
broadly circumscribed) grounds listed in the statute.73 One important element
is therefore missing to speak of full at will revocability, namely the ability to
use the right of at will removal for whatever number of directors the share-
holders meeting wishes. In addition, a Dutch court has seemingly indicated
that the removal remains subject to a judicial test against the Dutch concept of
reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid).74 If confirmed in later
jurisprudence, this would obviously put up another barrier to full at will
removability.
To a certain degree, shareholders’ influence filters through to the level of the
management board. It is the supervisory board which appoints and dismisses
members of the executive board,75 with dismissal being possible at any time.76
Still, it cannot proceed to a dismissal without first having heard the share-
holders meeting.77 While solely expressing its viewpoint, the shareholders
meeting carries a big stick, thanks to its power to trigger dismissal of the entire
supervisory board by withdrawing its confidence. Thus, even in the strictest
regime meant to reduce shareholder influence, one can still discern the roots
and effects of the rule of at will revocability.78
This goes much more for the second type of two-tier regime that exists in the
Netherlands. Dutch companies that are not subject to the structure regime
71 Art. 2:158 para. 4 Dutch Civil Code. The shareholders meeting can reject the proposed
candidate by an absolute majority of votes (art. 2:158 para. 9 Dutch Civil Code). At a
first meeting of shareholders, this absolute majority must also represent at least one
third of the outstanding capital. If the latter condition is not met, a second meeting can
be held in which the condition no longer applies (id.).
72 Artt. 2:25, 2:161(a) Dutch Civil Code. Such a resolution must be made with an absolute
majority that represents at least one third of the outstanding capital (id.).
73 Artt. 2:161 para. 2, 2:63(i) para. 2 Dutch Civil Code. A procedure before the enterprise
chamber can, among others, be instituted by a representative of the shareholders meet-
ing (art. 2:161 para. 2 Dutch Civil Code).
74 Enterprise Chamber 17 January 2007, LJNAZ6440, Ondernemingsrecht 2007, 157. See
Huizink, supra note 32, at 129; Van Schilfgaarde & Winter, supra note 67, at 429.
75 Art. 2:162 Dutch Civil Code. This cannot be restricted by a right of binding nomination
by other entities (id.).
76 Art. 2:134 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code; Asser et al., supra note 30, at 730.
77 Id.
78 For the relationship with labor law, see supra Part II.1.
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can, on a voluntary basis, establish a supervisory board in addition to the
management board.79 Both boards are then not only appointed by the share-
holders assembly,80 but can also be dismissed by that assembly.81 Although not
explicitly stated in the statute, it is generally assumed that this removal can be
made at will.82 These rules on removal are mandatory.83 A company cannot
deviate from them other than by voluntarily subjecting itself to the large
companies regime.84 The law only allows for one exception: up to one third
of the positions on a supervisory board can be elected and dismissed by others
if the articles so provide.85 The more traditional Dutch two-tier regime thus
more closely follows the general European principle.
(ii) Some Other European Two-Tier Board Models
As inGermany, Austria and theNetherlands, other jurisdictions with two-tier
boards grant the shareholders meeting most influence at the level of the super-
visory board. In France, an optional two-tier system with a managing board
(directoire) and a supervisory board (conseil de surveillance) was introduced in
1966,86 but has not become hugely popular.87 The members of the supervisory
board are appointed by the shareholders meeting88 and can be revoked ad
nutum by that meeting, even when that item was not put on the agenda of
the meeting.89 Belgium more recently introduced an optional two-tier system,
with a regular board of directors (conseil d’administration/raad van bestuur)
and an executive committee (comité de direction/directiecomité). It differs
from the French model in that the executive committee can be partially or
entirely made up of members of the board of directors.90 For the directors, the
79 Art. 2:140 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
80 Artt. 2:132 para. 1, 2:142 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code. The articles of association can grant
the right of binding nomination (of at least two candidates for each seat) to another
corporate body than the shareholders meeting for the appointment of executive or
supervisory directors (artt. 2:133 para. 1, 2:142 para. 2 Dutch Civil Code). The share-
holdersmeeting can, however, deprive the nomination of its binding character (art. 2:133
para. 2 Dutch Civil Code).
81 Artt. 2:134 para. 1, 2:144 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
82 Asser et al., supra note 30, at 629; P. Sanders, Dutch Company Law 101 (1977);
W.J. Slagter, Ondernemingsrecht 340 (8th ed. 2005).
83 Art. 2:25 Dutch Civil Code.
84 Van Schilfgaarde & Winter, supra note 67, at 209.
85 Artt. 2:143, 2:144 para. 1 Dutch Civil Code.
86 Artt. 118–150 Act No. 66–537 of 24 July 1966, J.O. 26 July 1966, 6402.
87 Cozian et al., supra note 4, at 301; Germain, supra note 21, at 263 (2009).
88 Art. L. 225-75 French Commercial Code.
89 Art. 225-75 al. 2 French Commercial Code.
90 Art. 524bis Belgian Companies Code. In contrast, a member of a French supervisory
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same rules apply as under the one-tier system. This implies election in and
removal from their function as a director by the shareholders meeting, with a
mandatory rule that be possible at will.91 Similarly, the Luxembourg two-tier
board is optional,92 with the supervisory board (conseil de surveillance) being
subject to the same at will removal right as a one-tier board.93 Finally, the
Italian elective dualistic system94 with a management board (consiglio di ges-
tione) and a supervisory board (consiglio di sorveglianza)95 fits in this gene-
ral scheme, with one qualification. Members of the supervisory board are in
principle appointed by the shareholders meeting96 and can be removed at will
by the shareholders meeting,97 but the company must indemnify dismissed
directors for damages that ensue from their removal.98
Even at the level of the management board, French law remains close to the
standard of ad nutum removability by the shareholders meeting. Although the
managing board is appointed by the supervisory board,99 it is to be removed by
the shareholders meeting if the articles of association do not grant this power
to the supervisory board.100 Such removal can, once again, be made at any
time.101 Admittedly, the removal can give rise to an indemnification duty if
no just cause is present,102 but even a divergence of opinions on how to run
the company, or a decision to return to a one-tier board is considered a just
board cannot be a member of the managing board (art. L. 225-74 French Commercial
Code).
91 Jean-Marie Nelissen Grade, Het nieuwe directiecomité, in Nieuw vennootschaps-
recht 2002. Wet corporate governance 106, 125 (Jan Ronse Instituut ed., 2003).
92 Art. 60bis-1 Luxembourg Companies Act.
93 Art. 60bis-4 Luxembourg Companies Act. There is some debate as to whether at will
removal is mandatory in a two-tier board (Conac, supra note 43).
94 Art. 2409-octies Italian Civil Code.
95 Art. 2409 ItalianCivil Code. Supervisory boardmembers may not occupy a position in
the management board (art. 2409-duodecies al. 10 Italian Civil Code; see Federico
Pernazza, Italy, in International Encyclopedia of Laws 121 (Roger Blanpain
ed., 2009).
96 Art. 2409-duodecies al. 2 Italian Civil Code. See Pernazza, supra note 95, at 120–21.
97 Art. 2409-duodecies al. 5 Italian Civil Code.
98 Id.
99 Art. L. 225–59 al. 1 French Commercial Code.
100 Art. L. 225–61 al. 1 French Commercial Code; Cozian et al., supra note 4, at 302;
Germain, supra note 21, at 497. Before the Act of 15 May 2001, the shareholders
meeting could revoke managing directors only upon proposal by supervisory board
and an indemnification was due in the absence of a just cause for removal (old art. L.
225–61 al. 1 French Commercial Code; Jean-Luc Aubert, La révocation des organes
d’administration des sociétés commerciales, Rev. trim. Dr. comm. 981 (1968);Merle,
supra note 21, at 540).
101 Art. L. 225–61 al. 1 French Commercial Code.
102 Art. L. 225–61 al. 1 French Commercial Code.
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cause.103 For better protection a managing director has to look outside the area
of corporate law, as he can in most cases enter into an employment agree-
ment.104
In contrast, shareholder say in removing managing directors is only indirect in
Belgium, Luxembourg and Italy. In Belgium, executive committee members
are in principle removable at will by the board of directors.105 Stockholders can
thus exercise their influence only through the board of directors, which is
removable at the will of the shareholders meeting.106 However, both the rule
of at will removal of executive committee members and the competence of the
board of directors in this regard are merely default rules.107 The shareholders
meeting can thus decide to amend the charter to increase or decrease its in-
fluence in the dismissal of executive committee members. Similarly, the man-
aging directors in a Luxembourg two-tier board are appointed by the super-
visory board,108 except if articles of association stipulate that this is a power of
the shareholders meeting.109 Removal then also happens through the super-
visory board and, if the articles of association so stipulate, the shareholders
meeting.110
In the Italian dual system as well, members of the management board are
appointed by the supervisory board111 and can be removed at will by the
supervisory board.112 The rule of at will removal is in play, again with the
qualification that damage caused by removal without a good cause is to be
indemnified.113 At will removal, with a qualification on the condition of no
payment obligations, thus carries over to the level of the management via a
controlled supervisory board. Again, at will removal thus plays a larger role
than it would appear at first sight. Italy, however, also has a third, more tradi-
tional board structure that is different from the traditional two-tier boards and
in which at will removal is strictly limited to one tier of the board. In this
system, the company is governed by a board of directors and an independent
board of auditors (collegio sindacale). The directors are in principle ap-
pointed114 and removable at will by the shareholders meeting. If no just cause
103 Cozian et al., supra note 4, at 302; Germain, supra note 21, at 498.
104 Germain, supra note 21, at 498;Merle, supra note 21, at 542.
105 Nelissen Grade, supra note 91, at 124; Van Ommeslaghe, supra note 21, at 116.
106 See supra, text accompanying note 91.
107 Nelissen Grade, supra note 91, at 124; Van Ommeslaghe, supra note 21, at 116.
108 Art. 60 bis-3 al. 1 Luxembourg Companies Act.
109 Art. 60bis-3 al. 2 Luxembourg Companies Act.
110 Art. 60bis-5 Luxembourg Companies Act.
111 Artt. 2409-nonies al. 3, 2409-terdecies Italian Civil Code.
112 Art. 2409-nonies al. 5 & 2409-terdecies Italian Civil Code.
113 Art. 2409-nonies al. 5 Italian Civil Code.
114 Art. 2383 al. 1 Italian Civil Code. See Pernazza, supra note 95, at 104–05.
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can be shown, the removed director is entitled to an indemnification,115 cover-
ing the forfeited fees and ancillary benefits.116 The shareholders meeting also
appoints the board of auditors,117 but it can proceed to removal only on just
grounds and with approval of the court.118
III. European Union Law on the Sidelines
Part II uncovered a remarkable commonality among the corporate laws of
several European jurisdictions with regard to director revocation. The follow-
ing paragraphs show that the European Union has not played any role in
creating this commonality. It has never imposed any provision relating to
director removal on its member states. Furthermore, the rule of at will revo-
cability also traditionally existed in a civil law jurisdiction that is not a member
of the European Union, namely Switzerland.119
1. Absence of Regulation by European Union
On two occasions, the European Union came close to regulating the appoint-
ment and removal of directors. Twice, it failed to do so because of insurmount-
able political opposition on the choice between one-tier and two-tier boards,
and especially on the question of employee involvement.
One occasion was the draft Fifth Company Law Directive, the original pro-
posal for which dates from 1972.120 On theGermanmodel, it contemplated the
compulsory establishment of a two-tier system of boards of directors, coupled
either with employee representation on a supervisory board elected by
the shareholders meeting121 or with a right of opposition for shareholders
and employees against appointment in case of a self-co-opting supervisory
board.122 The management board would be appointed and removed by the
115 Art. 2383 al. 3 Italian Civil Code.
116 Pernazza, supra note 95, at 107.
117 Art. 2400 al. 1 Italian Civil Code.
118 Art. 2400 al. 2 Italian Civil Code.
119 The case of the United Kingdom will be dealt with in Part V.
120 Proposal for a Fifth Directive on the Coordination of Safeguards Which for the Pro-
tection of the Interests of Members and Outsiders, are Required by Member States of
Companies Within the Meaning of Article 59, Second Paragraph, with Respect to
Company Structure and to the Power and Responsibilities of Company Boards,
1972 O.J. (C 131) 49 [hereinafter Proposed Fifth Directive].
121 Id. art. 4(2).
122 Id. art. 4(3).
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supervisory board.123 The latter would, in turn, be appointed by the share-
holders meeting,124 with obvious exceptions for worker representatives125 and
for supervisory boards chosen by co-optation.126 Aside from these exceptions,
the proposal followed the tradition of theOldContinent with regard to at will
removal of directors. If adopted, it would have rendered supervisory board
members subject to removal at any time by those who appointed them.127 A
single exception was drawn for members of a supervisory board elected by co-
optation, who could be recalled only on proper grounds and with judicial
intervention.128
Opposition against the proposed Directive led the European Parliament to
amend it in 1982 and the Commission to issue a new proposal in 1983.129 They
rendered the dualistic system optional and also allowed for a monistic board
consisting of both executive and non-executive directors.130 The new draft
maintained the earlier proposed provisions on removing members of super-
visory and management board for the dual board system.131 In addition, it
explicitly provided for at will revocability of the members of a single-tier
board.132 At will revocability thus played an important role in the European
framework. These provisions were not touched in the further history of the
123 Id. artt. 2 resp. 13(1)). The Economic and Social Committee advised that removal
should be possible exclusively on the basis of important reasons (Advice of the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, 1974 O.J. (C 109) 9, 13).
124 Artt. 4(2) al. 1, 4(4) Proposed Fifth Directive.
125 Art. 4(2) al. 2 Proposed Fifth Directive.
126 Art. 4(3) Proposed Fifth Directive.
127 Art. 13(2) Proposed Fifth Directive.
128 Artt. 13(2), 4(3) Proposed Fifth Directive.
129 Resolution Embodying theOpinion of the European Parliament on the Proposal from
the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Fifth Directive to
Coordinate the Safeguards Which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and
Others, are Required by Member States of Companies Within the Meaning of the
Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the EEC Treaty, as Regards the Structure of Sociétés
Anonymes and the Power and Obligations of Their Organs, 1982 O.J. (C 149) 20
[hereinafter EP Opinion]; Amended Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive Founded
on Article 54 (3) (G) of the Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Com-
panies and the Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 1983 O.J. (C 240) 2 [herein-
after First Amended Proposal].
130 Artt. 21bis-21undecies EP Opinion; artt. 21a-21u First Amended Proposal.
131 Art. 13 EP Opinion; art. 13 First Amended Proposal.
132 The Parliament’s amendments did not distinguish between removal of executive and of
non-executive directors (art. 21deciesEPOpinion). The amended proposal of 1983was
different in that it provided that executive members could be removed by non-exec-
utive and that non-executive members could be removed at any time by those who
appointed them (art. 21(t) First Amended Proposal).
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draft Fifth Directive, in the second amended proposal of 1991,133 or, despite
opposition from the Economic and Social Committee,134 in the third amended
proposal of the same year.135 Still, they did not become part of the European
acquis communautaire. The Draft Fifth Directive died a slow death and was
eventually withdrawn as an obsolete proposal in 2004.136
Another attempt to lay down state-of-the-art rules on the governance of
public companies was undertaken on the occasion of the introduction of a
European Company, or ”Societas Europaea”. This initiative had an even lon-
ger history than the failed Fifth Directive,137 but it was more successful, as it
led to the enactment of Regulation 2157/2001 (hereafter the “European Com-
panyRegulation”).138 However, the issue of director appointment and removal
was largely sidestepped, as the Regulation does not make, or require the
member states to make, a choice between a one-tier or a two-tier system. That
decision is to be made in the statutes of each individual European Company
and thus by its shareholders meeting.139 If the shareholders meeting opts for a
one-tier system, it will appoint the single administrative organ itself,140 similar
133 To the contrary, the second amended proposal implicitly supported at will revocability
by providing that neither national law nor a company’s charter could requiremore than
an absolute majority for the appointment or removal of directors: art. 36(3) Second
Amendment to the Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive Based on Article 54 of the
EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers
and Obligations of Their Organs, 1991 O.J. (C 7) 4.
134 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Second Amendment to the
proposal for a Fifth Council Directive based on Article 54 of the EEC Treaty con-
cerning the structure of public-limited companies and the powers and obligations of
their organs, 1991 O.J. (C 269) 48, 51.
135 Third Amendment to the Proposal for a Fifth Council Directive Based on Article 54 of
the EEC Treaty Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the
Powers and Obligations of Their Organs, 1991 O.J. (C 321) 9.
136 Withdrawal of obsolete Commission proposals, 2004 O.J. (C 5) 2–33.
137 Proposition de Règlement (CEE) du Conseil portant statut de la société anonyme
européenne, 1970 J.O. (C 124) 1. For the English version, see Bull. EC Supp. No. 8
(1970).
138 Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company, 2001 O.J.
(L 294) 1 [hereinafter European Company Regulation].
139 Art. 38 European Company Regulation.
140 Art. 43(3) European Company Regulation. In the European Company, up to half of
the members of the supervisory or administrative organ may be appointed by employ-
ees. Council Directive 2001/86 supplementing the Statute for a European company
with regard to the involvement of employees, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22. If half of the
members are appointed by employees, only a member appointed by the shareholders
meeting may be elected chairman of the administrative organ (art. 45 European Com-
pany Regulation) or, in the case of a two-tier board, the supervisory organ (art. 42
European Company Regulation). This is an important specification, as the chairman
has casting vote in the event of a tie (art. 50(2) European Company Regulation).
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to the above described situation for Belgian and French public companies with
a single-tier structure.141 In case of a European Company with a two-tiered
board, the shareholders meeting appoints only the supervisory organ,142 which
in turn appoints and recalls the management organ,143 as in a German public
company.144 A member state may, however, deviate from the latter rule and
require or permit the statutes to provide that the member(s) of the manage-
ment organ be appointed and removed by the shareholders meeting under the
same conditions as for public limited-liability companies that have registered
offices within its territory,145 such as, for instance, in a Dutch public company
with a two-tier board.146
The European Company Regulation did not enter into further detail on di-
rector revocation and refrained from specifying that the shareholders meeting
be able to revoke the members of a single-tier board or of a supervisory board.
The attribution of this competence is left to the statutes of the European
Company and national law.147 The one time that director removal was success-
fully broached at the EU level, the European legislator did not address the
question of whether such removal should be possible at will.
2. The Case of Switzerland
The previous paragraphs have shown that the norm of at will removal of
directors by the shareholders meeting does not ensue from European law.
Instead, it seems more closely connected to the European civil law tradition
as such. Switzerland is a natural test case for this statement and provides
anecdotal evidence supporting a link with civil law.
A Swiss public corporation (Aktiengesellschaft/société anonyme) is organized
according to a one-tier system, in which the board of directors (Verwaltungs-
rat/conseil d’administration) manages the business of the company.148 It is
141 See supra, Part II.1.
142 Art. 40(2) European Company Regulation.
143 Art. 39(2) al. 1 European Company Regulation.
144 See supra, Part II.2(i).
145 Art. 39(2) al. 2 European Company Regulation.
146 See supra, Part II.2(i).
147 See art. 52 al. 2 (referring to the European Company’s statutes and national law for the
non-regulated powers of the shareholders meeting) and art. 9 European Company
Regulation (setting out the hierarchical order of applicable provisions).
148 Art. 716 para. 2 Swiss Code ofObligations (as far as it has not delegated certain tasks to
the management).
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appointed by the shareholders meeting at its free discretion.149 The latter can
also revoke the directors at any time,150 without any need for justification.151
This right of removal at will is mandatory.152 The articles of association can
therefore not subject the revocation to the existence of a good cause.153
Although the principle of at will revocation is considered a vital element of
Swiss corporate law,154 it is subject to two qualifications. First, to some extent
the company’s articles of association may require a larger majority than the
default rule of a simple majority.155 However, a higher threshold may not
render dismissal impossible in the concrete case,156 a condition that is believed
not to be satisfied for requirements of more than three-quarter majorities.157
Second, the Swiss code stipulates that removed directors may be entitled to an
indemnity,158 but that is the case only if the director also has a labor agreement
with the company, and only then if removal is made without a just cause.159 As
in France and Belgium, a director can have a labor agreement with the com-
pany only for another function in the company than that of director.160 If the
director does not have a labor agreement, then indemnification is not due if the
removal was not untimely.161 Within the strict area of corporate law, however,
Switzerland fits the general scheme, because it showcases full at will revoca-
bility.
IV. The Origins of the Mandatory Rule of At Will Revocability
The previous Parts have revealed that ad nutum revocability seems tied to the
civil law tradition but not to the European Union. This is not a mere coinci-
dence. Part IV shows that mandatory at will revocability dates back far earlier
149 Art. 698 para. 2 No. 2 Swiss Code of Obligations; Peter Böckli, Schweizer Aktien-
recht 1557 (4th ed. 2009).
150 Art. 698 para. 2 No. 6, 705 para. 1 Swiss Code of Obligations.
151 HeinrichHonselletal., BaslerKommentar.Obligationenerecht II.Art. 590-
1186OR 964 (3rd ed. 2008).
152 Marc Bauen et al., La société anonyme suisse 174 (2007); Peter Forstmoser et
al., Schweizerisches Aktienrecht 284 (1996); Honsell et al., supra note 151, at
964.
153 Böckli, supra note 149, at 1565; Honsell et al., supra note 151, at 964.
154 Böckli, supra note 149, at 1564.
155 Id. at 1565; Honsell et al., supra note 151, at 965.
156 Id.
157 Honsell et al., supra note 151, at 965.
158 Art. 705 para. 2 Swiss Code of Obligations.
159 Honsell et al. supra note 151, at 966.
160 Böckli, supra note 149, at 1634.
161 Id. at 1635; Honsell et al., supra note 151, at 966.
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than the European Union. It first developed in France (Section 1) and rapidly
spread over continental Europe (Section 2).
1. The Development of At Will Revocability in France
Historians trace the origins of the stock corporation back to the seventeenth
century chartered companies for overseas expeditions, the medieval commen-
da, the late medieval Italian banks, Roman publican companies and companies
of heirs or even to earlier civilizations.162 Limited liability came to its full
development in the East India companies which first emerged in England
and the Netherlands at the dawn of the seventeenth century, and later also
in France and the German territories.163 Their establishment always necessi-
tated governmental approval, and the applicable rules were determined on a
case-by-case basis.164 The directors were generally not revocable and were
often even appointed for life – or for the duration of the company.165
The first attempt to set out general rules applicable to all companies was made
in France under King Louis XIVand his Minister for Economic Affairs, Jean-
Baptiste Colbert. They commissioned businessman Jacques Savary to codify
162 Louis Fredericq, Traité de Droit Commercial Belge 419 (1950); Ernest
Frignet, Histoire de l’association commerciale 45–74 (1868); Jean Hilaire,
Introduction Historique au Droit Commercial 167–70 (1986); Malherbe et
al., supra note 21, at 258; Jan Ronse, Algemeen Deel van het Vennootschaps-
recht 10–11 (3rd ed. 1975); Troplong, Commentaire du Contrat de Société en
Matière Civile et Commerciale 259 (1843); Guido A. Ferrarini,Origins of Limited
Liability Companies and Company LawModernisation in Italy : AHistorical Outline,
in VOC 1602-2002: 400 Years of Company Law 190 (Ella Gepken-Jager et al. eds.,
2005).
163 Pierre-Henri Conac, The French and Dutch East India Companies in Comparative
Legal Perspective, in VOC 1602-2002, supra note 162, at 133 (France); Ella Gepken-
Jager, The Dutch East India Company, in VOC 1602-2002, supra note 162, at 41–81
(Netherlands); Ron Harris, The English East India Company and the History of
Company Law, in VOC 1602-2002, supra note 162, at 219, 219–20 (England); Erik
Kieling, Das preuische Eisenbahngesetz von 1838, in 1 Aktienrecht im Wandel.
Entwicklung des Aktienrechts 126, 134 (Walter Bayer & Mathias Habersack eds.,
2007) (Prussia).
164 Conac, supra note 163, at 136, 148 (France); Albrecht Cordes & Katharaina Jahntz,
Aktiengesellschaften vor 1807?, in 1 Aktienrecht im Wandel, supra note 163, at 15
(general); Gepken-Jager, supra note 163, at 44–45 (Netherlands); Harris, supra note
163, at 219–20 (England).
165 Conac, supra note 163, at 142–43 (France: limited term in 1664, but for life in 1723);
Cordes & Jahntz, supra note 164, at 21 (general); Gepken-Jager, supra note 163, at 54–
55 (Netherlands: governors first appointed for life, but as of 1623 only for three-year
terms; directors appointed until next Chamber meeting).
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the unwritten customary commercial laws, which in 1673 resulted in a decree
now commonly referred to as the Decree of Colbert, the Ordonnance de
commerce, the Code Marchand or the Code Savary.166 The few company-
related provisions dealt only with partnership forms,167 in which all associates
or the managing associates had the power to run the company.168
Gradually, organizations were created in France that featured some traits
characteristic of the stock corporation, such as transferable shares, centralized
management and limited liability.169 Their charters commonly allotted the
power to appoint and revoke directors to the meeting of shareholders.170
The charters of these germinal stock corporations served as a source of inspi-
ration for the French Code de Commerce,171 enacted in 1807 during Napo-
leon’s reign. This codification reflected existing law and practice rather than
attempting to innovate.172 In addition to the forms regulated by the Decree of
Colbert, theCode de Commerce now explicitly covered the stock corporation
(société anonyme).173 Government approval was no longer required for start-
ing up the former, but it remained a condition for establishment of the latter.174
The stock corporation distinguished itself from the old company forms in that
its governance could be entrusted to non-shareholders.175 Directors176 were
166 Philippe Bornier, Ordonnance de Louis XIV sur le Commerce 55–75 (1767).
167 Article 1 of the Decree refers to the société générale (or société en nom collectif) and the
société en commandite. Legal practice had also developed a third form called the société
anonyme. Contrary to its current meaning, the société anonyme was anything but a
stock corporation, and instead referred to a sleeping partnership. Bornier, supra note
166, at 57–58; 2 Jacques Savary, Le Parfait Négociant 20–25 (2nd ed. 1679).
168 Henri Lévy-Bruhl, Histoire Juridique des Sociétés de Commerce en France
aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles 159, 191 (1938).
169 Hilaire, supra note 162, at 202–06; Lévy-Bruhl, supra note 168, at 30, 42–53.
170 Lévy-Bruhl, supra note 168, at 196. It should be noted, however, that the composition
of the meeting of shareholders and that of the meeting of directors were often over-
lapping entirely. Id. at 204.
171 Troplong, supra note 162, at 173.
172 Jean-Louis Halpérin, Histoire des droits en Europe de 1750 à nos jours 64
(2004); Andreas Deutsch,Die Aktiengesellschaft im Code de Commerce von 1807 und
ihre Vobildfunction für die Entwicklung in Deutschland, in 1 Aktienrecht im Wan-
del, supra note 163, at 48–49.
173 Art. 29–37 Code de Commerce of 1807. As of then, the term société anonyme was
reserved for the stock corporation and no longer referred to sleeping partnerships (see
supra note 167). The Code de Commerce also allowed the sleeping partnership, as of
then called association en participation. Artt. 47–50 Code de Commerce of 1807.
174 Art. 37 Code de Commerce of 1807.
175 Art. 31 Code de Commerce of 1807; Deutsch, supra note 172, at 65 (Fremdorgan-
schaft).
176 It should be noted that the term “directors” in the beginning of the nineteenth century
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considered agents for the corporation,177 a classification which had appeared
earlier in the French Code Civil of 1804.178 Pursuant to the Code Civil, an
agent’s mandate could be revoked at the principal’s discretion.179 In accordance
with this principle, theCode de Commerce stipulated that the société anonyme
“is governed by temporary, revocable agents”.180 On the basis of this absolute
wording and the specific character of the société anonyme – with numerous
investors for whom not the person of the director(s) but the company’s project
is of overriding importance – legal scholars immediately construed this rule to
be essential to the stock corporation.181 Unlike in agency law and other cor-
porate forms, the rule of at will removability was therefore considered man-
datory in the société anonyme.182
2. The Proliferation of At Will Revocability in Continental Europe
The impact of theCode deCommerce cannot be overestimated. It was directly
applicable in Napoleon’s empire and dependent territories, and served as a
model far beyond its borders.183 The following paragraphs illustrate that,
together with theCode de Commerce, the rule of at will revocability of board
members became widespread on the European continent and largely remained
in force until today.
First of all, as one can deduce from the previous Parts, the provision on at will
also included top management (Anne Lefèbvre-Teillard, La société anonyme au
XIXe siècle 259–62 (1985)).
177 Artt. 31–32 Code de Commerce of 1807.
178 TheNapoleonic Codes distinguished between civil and commercial corporate law (art.
1873 Civil Code of 1804; art. 18 Code de Commerce of 1807). In civil corporate law,
directors were revocable at will unless they had been appointed in the incorporation
deed. Art. 1856 al. 2 Code Civil of 1804 : ”Ce pouvoir ne peut être révoqué sans cause
légitime, tant que la société dure; mais s’il n’a été donné que par acte postérieur au
contrat de société, il est révocable comme un simple mandat.” (emphasis added) Civil
corporate law did not apply to companies with commercial activities and will be left
out of consideration in the present study.
179 Art. 2004 Code Civil of 1804.
180 Art. 31 Code de Commerce of 1807: ”Elle est administrée par des mandataires à temps,
révocables, associés ou non associés, salariés ou gratuits.”
181 M. Delangle, Des sociétés commerciales 170–71 (1844); M. Delangle, Commen-
taire sur les Sociétés Commerciales, in Troplong, supra note 162, at 547–48.
182 Id.; T. Campenon, Le Code de Commerce et les Lois Commerciales. Commen-
taire Usuel 12 (1865). The classification as mandatory law deviates from agency law,
where at will revocability is merely a default rule. Delangle, in Troplong, supra note
181, at 548.
183 1 Pierre Arminjon et al., Traité de droit comparé 131–79 (1950); Halpérin,
supra note 172, at 64–66.
ECFR 2/2011Sofie Cools224
revocability remained applicable in France. It was repeated in a ministerial
instruction of 22 October 1817.184 In accordance with this instruction, the
government systematically rejected charter provisions that would limit the
effects of at will revocability.185 The provision that directors were revocable
was repeated in the Act of 24 July 1867,186 which abolished the requirement of
government approval for the constitution of a stock corporation187 and which
served as a basis for current French corporate law.188 The provision was still
interpreted as imposing at will revocability and continued to be counted as an
essential andmandatory part of the law for stock corporations.189 Not surpris-
ingly, the next major corporate law revision in 1966 resulted in an explicit
affirmation of at will revocability: at any time, the shareholders meeting could
remove members of the pre-existing one-tier board,190 as well as the members
of both parts of the newly introduced and optional two-tier board.191 These
provisions survived and were codified in the new commercial code of 18
September 2000.192
Napoleon’s Code de Commerce was equally applicable in the Southern Neth-
erlands, as they had been annexed to the French republic in 1794. Upon the
Northern and Southern Netherlands’ independence and formation of the
Dutch Kingdom in 1815, steps were taken to elaborate a new commercial
code.193 Before the Dutch commercial code entered into effect, however, Bel-
gium separated itself from the Northern Netherlands in 1830. The Code de
Commerce, which had continued to be in force in the meantime, was main-
tained upon independence with the intention to subject it to revision.194 The
company law provisions were not revised until the Act of 18May 1873.195 The
Act drew inspiration from the recent French corporate law amendments and
abolished the required authorization for the incorporation of new stock cor-
184 3Ministère de l’intérieur, Circulaires, instructions, et autres actes 266, 270
(2nd ed. 1823) (”les actes sociaux ne peuvent réserver à aucun individu [. . .] aucun droit à
la gestion perpétuelle ou irrévocable”).
185 Charles E. Freedeman, Joint-Stock Enterprise in France, 1807-1867: From
Privileged Company to Modern Corporation 43 (1979).
186 Art. 22 Act of 24 July 1867.
187 Id. art. 21.
188 Germain, supra note 21, at 259; Pierre Van Ommeslaghe, Le Régime des Sociétés
par Actions et leur Administration en Droit Comparé 80 (1960).
189 H.-F. Rivière, Commentaire de la loi du 24 juillet 1867 sur les sociétés 226–27
(1868).
190 Art. 90 al. 2 Act No. 66–537 of 24 July 1966, J.O. 26 July 1966, 6402.
191 Id. artt. 121, 134.
192 See supra, Part II.2(ii).
193 Asser et al., supra note 30, at 3–4.
194 Art. 139 Belgian Constitution of 1831.
195 P. Namur, Le Code de Commerce Belge Revisé 13–15 (1884).
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porations.196 It also explicitly adopted the at will revocability of directors,
stipulating that “they are always revocable by the general meeting [of share-
holders]”.197 After the French example, this provision was considered man-
datory law and even “of public order”198 and has therefore survived further
company law revisions.199 The current Belgian Companies Code, in fact, con-
tains the exact same provision on director revocability as the Act of 1873.200
The French Code de Commerce of 1807 was also imposed in the Northern
Netherlands during their occupation in 1811.201 After their liberation a few
years later, the Dutch started preparing their own commercial code (Wetboek
van Koophandel) which, after some delay due to negotiations with Southern
Netherlands and their subsequent secession, was finally adopted and in force
in 1838.202 The Dutch commercial code reiterated many of the Code de Com-
merce‘s provisions on stock corporations,203 and in the same line of thought
provided that directors could not be irrevocably appointed.204 As indicated
above, it was only in 1971 that the major exception of the structure regime was
introduced.205
The influence of the Napoleonic codification also reached German corporate
law, starting off with its application in those parts that were annexed to or
depended on France.206 After the breakdown of the French empire, several
196 See artt. 4, 30 Act of 18 May 1873.
197 Art. 45 al. 3 Act of 18 May 1873 (own translation). See id. art. 43.
198 J. Guillery, Commentaire Législatif de la Loi du 18Mai 1873 sur les Sociétés
Commerciales en Belgique 122 (1878); Charles Resteau, Traité des Sociétés
Anonymes 69–70 (1933).
199 See Ministerial Instruction of 20 February 1841 Regarding the Applications for Au-
thorization for the Formation of New Stock Corporations, § 10 al. 2: ”Il est stipulé que
les admistrateurs [. . .] sont nommés et toujours révocables par l’assemblée générale.” In
the twentieth century, a proposal to modify company law included substantial toning
down of the rule of at will revocability, but it was never adopted (Artt. 90, 94 para. 2, 99
para. 1 Bill, Doc. parl., Ch. Repr., 1979–80, No. 387).
200 Art. 518 para. 3 Belgian Companies Code.
201 Asser et al., supra note 30, at 3; Deutsch, supra note 172, at 89; R.J.Q. Klomp, ’Deze
ijdele praal’. Het handelsrecht in Nederland na de codificatie, in Tweehonderd jaar
wetboek van koophandel – Bicentenaire du code de commerce 105, 110–11
(G. Martyn & D. Heirbaut eds., 2009).
202 Deutsch, supra note 172, at 89–90; Asser et al., supra note 30, at 3–4.
203 Deutsch, supra note 172, at 90; Klomp, supra note 201, at 112–18; Norbert Reich, Die
Entwicklung des deutschen Aktienrechtes im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, in 2 Ius Com-
mune. Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Europäische Re-
chtsgeschichte 242–43 (Helmut Coing ed., 1969).
204 Art. 44 al. 2 Dutch Commercial Code of 1838.
205 See supra, Part II.2(i).
206 Kurt Bösselmann, Die Entwicklung des deutschen Aktienwesens in 19. Jahr-
hundert 63 (1939); Deutsch, supra note 172, at 91–92; Reich, supra note 203, at 239.
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states of the German confederation abolished the Code de Commerce, while
others left it in place.207 Several states also introduced or prepared corporate
laws that were based on the Code de Commerce,208 including Prussia with its
Stock Corporations Act of 1843.209 The latter indirectly served as the main
source of inspiration for the General German Commercial Code (Allgemeines
Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch or ADHGB) of 1861,210 which in turn became
Germany’s national corporate law (Reichsgesetz) upon its unification in 1870–
71.211 As a result, the ADHGB also stipulated that the appointment of direc-
tors be revocable at any time, albeit that directors could possibly be entitled to
damages.212 In addition to requiring the existence of this board (Vorstand), the
ADHGB allowed the installation of a supervisory board (Aufsichtrat),213 but
did not contain any prescriptions with regard to its appointment or dismiss-
al.214
The installation of a supervisory board was rendered mandatory only by the
Act of 11 June 1870.215 By the same act the requirement for government
approval for the establishment of a stock corporation was abolished,216
and the supervisory board was instead mandated to control the board’s man-
agement on behalf of the shareholders.217 Following another revision in
207 Deutsch, supra note 172, at 92–97.
208 Reich, supra note 203, at 243–45; Christoph Bergfeld, Aktienrechtliche Reformvorha-
ben vor demADHGB, in 1Aktienrecht imWandel, supra note 163, at 168, 172, 179,
183, 189.
209 Reich, supra note 203, at 251; Erik Kieling,Das preuische Aktiengesetz von 1843, in
1 Aktienrecht im Wandel, supra note 163, at 191, 197.
210 Louis Pahlow,Aktienrecht un Aktiengesellschaft zwischen Revolution und Reichgrün-
dung. Das Allgemeine Deutsche Handelsgesetzbuch von 1861, in 1 Aktienrecht im
Wandel, supra note 163, at 237, 246–48, 250.
211 Kübler &Assmann, supra note 59, at 7. The code was introduced bymost members of
the German confederation even before its unification (Pahlow, supra note 210, at 241).
A previous attempt to uniformize German corporate law failed together with the
Revolution of 1848–49 (id. at 243–45).
212 Art. 227 al. 3 ADHGB.
213 Art. 225 al. 1 ADHGB.
214 The ADHGB left the organization of its appointment to the charter (art. 209 No. 7
ADHGB). The assumption that the appointment and revocationwas to bemade by the
shareholders meeting can be deduced from art. 231 ADHGB (see Pahlow, supra note
210, at 268).
215 Art. 209No. 6 ADHGB, as amended byAct of 11 June 1870, BGBl. 1870 1870, No. 21,
375.
216 See art. 208 ADHGB, as amended by Act of 11 June 1870.
217 Reich, supra note 203, at 267–68; Jan Lieder, Die 1. Aktienrechsnovelle vom 11. Juni
1870, in 1 Aktienrecht im Wandel, supra note 163, at 318, 357–58. The German
legislator in 1884 reinforced this intention (Sibylle Hofer,Das Aktiengesetz von 1884 –
ein Lehrstück für prinzipielle Schutzkonzeptionen, in 1 Aktienrecht im Wandel,
ECFR 2/2011 Europe’s Ius Commune on Director Revocability 227
1884218 and in accordance with the spirit of the Code de Commerce, the
ADHGB extended the rule of at will revocability to the supervisory board.219
With regard to members of the managing board though, shareholders’ influ-
ence decreased. Although they continued to be removable at any time,220 the
Act seemed to assume that the supervisory board decided on their appoint-
ment and removal.221 The well-known German commercial code of 10 May
1897 (Handelsgesetzbuch or HGB)222 largely maintained pre-existing corpo-
rate law.223 As a result, it crystallized the above sketched combination of the
rule of ad nutum revocability with a dual board structure and provided that
the appointments of both the supervisory and the managing board were sub-
ject to revocation.224 It is only fairly recently that the principle of at will
removal was curtailed in the German tradition, by the Act of 30 January
1937, which introduced the – above mentioned and qualified – requirement
of a good cause for the removal of managing directors.225
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands are thus shining examples of how
thanks to Napoleon’s codification and conquests the notion of mandatory
ad nutum revocability spread beyond the borders of France. Obviously, the
influence of Napoleon’s commercial code reached far beyond the jurisdictions
here examined and includes Luxembourg, Egypt, Poland, Italy, Greece, Ro-
mania, Serbia, Turkey, Brazil etc.226 Many of these seem to have similar rules
supra note 163, at 388, 412), after it became clear that in reality the supervisory board
tended to become a governing body rather than a continuation of the shareholders
meeting, under control often of the founders and later the controlling shareholder
(Lieder, supra note 217, at 360–64).
218 Act of 18 July 1884, RGBl. 1884, No. 22, 123. See Reich, supra note 203, at 274–76.
219 With a three-fourths majority (artt. 191 al. 4, 224 ADHGB, as amended by Act of 18
July 1884). See Hofer, supra note 217, at 412.
220 Art. 227 al. 3 ADHGB, as amended byAct of 18 July 1884. The law continued to make
a reservation for contractual indemnification obligations (id.).
221 See id. art. 225a.
222 RGBl. 1897, 219. For an English translation of the HGB of 1897, see A.F. Schuster,
The German Commercial Code (1911).
223 Louis Pahlow,Das Aktienrecht imHandelsgesetzbuch von 1897, in 1Aktienrecht im
Wandel, supra note 163, at 415.
224 Art. 231 HGB stipulated that the appointment of the managing board be subject to
revocation at any time, not affecting any right to indemnification from a contract.
Members of the supervisory board could be revoked by the shareholders meeting
pursuant to art. 243 HGB.
225 Art. 75 para. 3 Aktiengesetz of 30 January 1937, RBGl. 1937, I, 107–65; Kübler &
Assmann, supra note 59, at 203; Walter Bayer & Sylvia Engelke, Die Revision des
Aktienrechts durch das Aktiengesetz von 1937, in 1 Aktienrecht im Wandel, supra
note 163, at 617, 648. This act was largely taken over in Austria. See supra, Part II. 2(i).
226 Deutsch, supra note 172, at 89.
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regarding director removal.227 This find raises the question of whether the
common law legal family has an identical tradition.
V. The Lower Significance of Revocability in Common Law
However self-evident at will removability of corporate directors may have
seemed during most of the history of civil law, it did not play as important a
role in traditional common law. The absence of at will removal in old common
law has often been overlooked in extant legal doctrine. An important cause
might well reside in the fact that both in the United Kingdom and in the
United States, the law has more recently moved in the direction of at will
removal. This Part shows that at will removal was not part of the original
common law, but slowly got adopted in the United Kingdom and to a lesser
extent in the United States.228
1. The United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, a first important step in the development of the
incorporated joint stock company was made by the chartering of the English
East India Company in 1600.229 The subsequent development drastically
slowed down upon the passage of the Bubble Act in 1720, which severely
restricted the formation of joint stock companies.230 Only when the Bubble
Act was repealed in 1825 did corporate law start to develop.231 This develop-
ment occurred with no discernable influence fromNapoleon’s Code de Com-
merce or civil and roman law in general.232
In the nineteenth century, English joint stock companies acts did not prescribe
at will revocability of directors. At will revocability did not appear in the 1844
227 See supra, Part II.
228 For Canada, see Roger G. Bailey, Shareholder Control over Management: The Re-
moval of Directors, 20McGill L. J. 85, 88 (1974).
229 Paul Davies, Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 20 (6th ed. 1997);
Harris, supra note 163, at 217.
230 Act of 6 Geo 1, c. 18, 1719; Bishop Carleton Hunt, The Development of the
Business Corporation in England 1800-1867 (1936); Ronald Ralph Formoy,
The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law 23–29, 47–52 (1923);
Ron Harris, The Bubble Act: Its Passage and its Effects on Business Organization, 54
J. Econ. Hist. 610 (1994).
231 Act of 6Geo 4, c. 91, 1825;Davies, supra note 229, at 33–34;Formoy, supra note 230, at
52–55.
232 Arminjon et al., supra note 183; James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the
Business Corporation in the Law of the United States 1780-1970, 2, 7 (1970).
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Act.233 It was introduced several years later, but merely as a default rule that
appeared in the table containing model provisions applicable in the absence or
silence of articles of incorporation.234 Even when these default provisions
applied, at will removal still required a “special resolution” of the shareholders
meeting, which implies a three-fourths majority requirement.235 Until 1948,
shareholders could not dismiss directors if they could not show a good cause,
and the articles of association did not provide for at will removal.236 Waiting
until the end of the director’s term of office and then appoint another director
was not always an available solution, as directors could be appointed for life.237
Shareholders had to wait until 1948 for the legislator to intervene.238 Since
then, English law has prescribed at will removal of directors.239 Any stipula-
tion to the contrary in an agreement between the company and a director
would not stand in the way of shareholders’ right to remove directors at
any time.240 Yet, as in many jurisdictions on the continent, a director can have
a service agreement with the company that entitles him to compensation or
damages if that agreement is terminated as well.241
2. The United States
One would jump to conclusions too fast to assume that early American law
did not feature at will revocability because early English law did not. Amer-
ican corporate law is to a large part indigenous and draws from English law
only to a limited extent.242 At the time the first American colonies were estab-
233 Act of 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, 1844.
234 SeeAct of 19& 20Vict. c. 47, 1856 (art. 62 of table B and art. IX of the Act); Act of 25&
26 Vict. c. 89, 1862 (art. 65 of table A and art. XVof the Act). Table B of the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1856 had sometimes erroneously been considered as an obligatory
code of rules (Henry Thring & G.A.R. Fitzgerald, The Law and Practice of
Joint-Stock and other Public Companies 252–53 (3rd ed. 1875).
235 See art. XXXIV Joint StockCompanies Act of 1856; art. LI Joint StockCompanies Act
of 1862; Thring & Fitzgerald, supra note 234, at 167.
236 Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Company, Blackpool v. Hampson (1882), 23 Ch.D. 1.
237 Laurence C.B. Gower, Modern Company Law 133 (3rd ed. 1969).
238 Paul Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 389 (8th
ed. 2008).
239 Art. 168(1) UK Companies Act of 2006.
240 Davies, supra note 238, at 389.
241 Davies, supra note 238, at 392–98. The duration of a director’s service contract is not to
exceed two years except with approval of the shareholders meeting (art. 188 UK
Companies Act of 2006).
242 EdwinMerrickDodd, American Business Corporations Until 1860, 13–14, 195
(1954); Hurst, supra note 232, at 1, 8–9.
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lished, common law on corporations was still very incomplete and American
law had to innovate a great deal.243
Still, at will revocability of corporate directors was foreign to American law as
well as to English law. American jurisprudence and scholarship refers to com-
mon law as stipulating that “shareholders could remove a director only ‘for
cause’”.244 The same holds for legislative efforts: according to the Official
Comment on MBCA §8.08, the common law position was “that directors
have a statutory entitlement to their office and can be removed only for cause –
fraud, criminal conduct, gross abuse of office amounting to a breach of trust,
or similar conduct.”245 This position was derived from “the conception that
the power of directors was drawn from the statute and not solely from the
shareholders”.246
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, American states increasingly
regarded directors rather than shareholders as the embodiment of the corpo-
ration and continued to make it difficult for shareholders to remove direc-
tors.247 It appears that, as in the UK, more reliance was put on directors’ short
terms of appointment. Each time upon expiration, the stockholders meeting
could refuse to reappoint a director. Massachusetts, for instance, used to have
corporate law provisions on the election of directors and provided that direc-
tors remained in place until others were chosen in their stead. But it did not
contain any provisions regarding removal during term.248
In 1960, at will removal was introduced as a default rule in theModel Business
Corporations Act (MBCA).249 To date, theMBCA still states that ”[t]he share-
holders may remove one or more directors with or without cause unless the
articles of incorporation provide that directors may be removed only for
cause.”250 A small majority of the American states have enacted comparable
243 PaulineMaier,The RevolutionaryOrigins of the AmericanCorporation, 50William &
Mary Q. 51, 52 (1993).
244 William T. Allen et al., Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business
Organization 173 (3rd ed. 2009).
245 1American BarAssociation,Model Business CorporationAct Annotated 8–
77 (4th ed. 2008).
246 American Bar Association, supra note 245, at 8–78. Nevertheless, some cases up-
held charter or bylaw provisions that permitted shareholders to remove directors
without cause (id. at 8–78, 8–79).
247 William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Cor-
poration in America 156 (1997).
248 44 Revised Statutes § 5 (1836); 106 Public Statutes § 24 (1882); 437 Business Corpo-
ration Act § 18 (1903).
249 American Bar Association, supra note 245, at 8–78, 8–79.
250 MBCA §8.08(1).
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provisions on director removal by stockholders and thus do not have a man-
datory rule of at will revocability.251
Outside theMBCA states, there is no tendency toward imposing a mandatory
rule of at will revocability either.252 The most important jurisdiction for the
purpose of this study is Delaware, since the majority of American companies
is incorporated in Delaware.253 Pursuant to Delaware law, directors can be
removed only for cause if they are divided into classes, unless the certificate of
incorporation otherwise provides.254 Most of the large public Delaware com-
panies have a staggered board,255 the members of which can thus not be re-
moved by the stockholders at will. A few other states have similar provi-
sions,256 while Illinois merely allows the articles of incorporation to limit
removal to cases where a cause is present when the board is staggered.257
251 Ala. Code § 10A-2-8.08 (2011); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-808 (2011); Ark. Code
Ann. § 4-27-808 (2010);Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-108-108 (2010);Conn.Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 33-742 (2010); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0808 (2010);Ga. CodeAnn. § 14-2-808 (2011);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 414-198 (2010); Idaho Code § 30-1-808 (2011); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 23-1-33-8 (2011); Iowa Code § 490.808 (2010); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271B.8-080
(2010); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:81(C)(4) (2011);Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13-C, § 808
(2011);Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156B, § 51(a) (2010);Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.1511
(2011); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.223 (2010); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-8.08 (2010);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.315 (2011); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-424 (2010); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 21-2085 (2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:8.08 (2010); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-8-08 (2010); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-41 (2010); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 1701.58(C), (D) (2011); Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.324 (2009); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.2.-
805 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-108 (2009); S.D. Codified Laws § 47-1A-808
(2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-18-108 (2010); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-808
(2011);Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11A, § 8.08 (2010);Va.CodeAnn. § 13.1-680 (2010);Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 23B.08.080 (2011); W. Va. Code § 31D-8-808 (2011); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 180.0808 (2010);Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-16-808 (2011).
252 In addition, in several states, not only the shareholders meeting but also the board of
directors can remove directors.American Bar Association, supra note 245, at 8-84.
253 Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. &
Econ. 383, 389 (2003).
254 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(k).
255 Bebchuk et al., supra note 11, at 895-96.
256 All of these states allow removal without cause unless the board is staggered, but they
differ in the exceptions that can be made in the articles of incorporation. Some allow
the articles of incorporation to provide for removability in the absence of a cause even
for staggered boards (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-6301(k) (2009);N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-
39 (2010);Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1027(H) (2010)); one allows removability with-
out cause for corporations without staggered boards (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:6-6
(2011)); and still others allow both types of deviations, in the charter and/or bylaws
(Md. Code Ann., Corps & Ass’ns § 2-406 (2011); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§ 1726(a)(1) (2010); Tex. Bus. Org. Code Ann. § 21.409 (2010)).
257 805 Ill. Ann. Stat. 5/8.35 (2011).
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Finally, the state of New York does not allow director removal without cause
unless the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws explicitly provide other-
wise,258 and the District of Columbia is silent about director removal en-
tirely.259
A mandatory rule of removability of directors without a cause is not an
American thing. Only three states provide for at will removal without explic-
itly allowing for deviations in the articles of incorporation and/or the by-
laws.260 Even in the current debate and recent initiatives with regard to
strengthening shareholder power, at will removal of directors has – so far –
not been proposed as a means to enhance shareholders’ say.
Conclusion
This article investigates through a comparative and historical analysis whether
there is a general principle in European civil law regarding director removal.
The investigation focuses on the circumstances in which directors can be
removed from office. In particular, can shareholders oust them at will, or is
there a requirement of good cause, an indemnification obligation for early
termination, a waiting or notice period and/or a minimum or maximum num-
ber of directors that can be removed at once?
The analysis demonstrates that a mandatory rule of at will revocability of
company directors is widespread across the civil law tradition in Europe –
including the French and the German and probably even the Scandinavian
family. Moreover, the rule in these jurisdictions is relatively old, dating back
more than two centuries to the time of the first development of corporate law.
It was first laid downwith general applicability in the French commercial code
of 1807 and spread over Europe thanks to Napoleon’s conquests and the role
of his commercial code as a model for later codifications of commercial law
elsewhere.
The scope of application and the intensity of the rule of at will removal of
directors have decreased over time. This is for the most part due to the fairly
recent introduction of two-tier boards in addition to or replacing pre-existing
one-tier boards. In these new models, shareholders’ say in the removal of
supervisory boardmembers has mostly not been affected. Managing directors,
in contrast, can often – but not always – be removed only by the supervisory
258 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 706 (2011).
259 See D.C. Code Ann. § 29-101.32-33 (2011).
260 Other than adaptations for techniques such as cumulative voting and increased voting
requirements such as in Nevada: Alaska Stat. § 10.06.460 (2011); Cal. Corp. Code
§ 303 (2010); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.335 (2010).
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board. Yet, functionally speaking, in most cases the shareholders’ influence
continues to be felt, by cascading through their control over the supervisory
board, to the level of the management board.
The history of the two chief common law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom
and the United States, contrasts sharply with that of European civil law. An
important finding of this article is that amandatory rule of atwill revocability is
not part of the old common law. In theUnitedKingdom, the principle appeared
early as a default rule, but it only became compulsory halfway through the
twentieth century. In the United States, many states have by now introduced
the rule but still allow the company to deviate in its articles of incorporation.
The findings of this article open new perspectives as well as new questions for
further research. The rule of at will removal in the corporate context derives
from old French civil law,261 which in turn finds much of its base in Roman
law.262 An obvious question is then whether mandatory at will removability of
directors can be traced back to the ius commune in its historical sense, i.e.
Roman law as received on the European continent as of the Middle Ages. The
findings of this article can also help us understand certain phenomena. Indeed,
since at will removability of directors is crucial in determining the power
relations within a corporation, a difference on this point between common
and civil law presumably interacts with other divergences between both legal
cultures. For instance, the finding of this difference offers support for a hy-
pothesis I made earlier with regard to a possible association and even partially
causal relationship between removability of directors and stock ownership
structures.263 The possible existence of an association is to an important extent
buoyed by the finding that at will removability is generally mandatory in civil
law jurisdictions, where stock ownership is predominantly concentrated, but
often absent or at least not compulsory in the main common law jurisdictions,
where stock ownership is significantly more dispersed. The fact that the man-
datory rule of at will removability traces back earlier than the development of
these stock ownership patterns, moreover suggests that at least a partial cau-
sation may run from the regulation of director removal to prevailing stock
ownership patterns.
The least one can say is that a longstanding difference between civil and
common law with regard to the shareholders’ authority to remove those in
charge of governing the company is so fundamental that it is a premise abso-
lutely to be taken into account in comparative corporate law, especially where
power relations within corporations are considered.
261 See supra, Part IV.1.
262 Halpérin, supra note 172, at 69.
263 Cools, supra note 16, at 755-62; Cools, supra note 17, at 179-92.
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